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THE BRENNAN LECTURE:
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE PUBLIC
Josh Chafetz*
It is, of course, a standard trope of named lectures to begin by tying
one's topic to the lecture's namesake. Fortunately, you've given me a lot
to work with: In his nearly thirty-four years on the United States Supreme
Court, William Brennan authored 1,360 total opinions (majority,
concurring, and dissenting), second only to William 0. Douglas's 1,628.'
Although Brennan is primarily known for his liberal decisions on civil
rights and civil liberties 2 and his interest in the use of state constitutional
law to protect individual rights,3 his prodigious output means that there's
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. This Article is a lightly revised version of the
William J. Brennan Lecture at Oklahoma City University School of Law, delivered in
October 2017. 1 am grateful to the lecture's organizers, especially Andy Spiropoulos, for
the invitation and to the audience for thought-provoking questions. Thanks also to
Catherine Roach for comments on an earlier draft. Any remaining errors or infelicities are,
of course, my own.
1. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S.
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II, at 127 (5th rev. ed. 2008).
2. See, e.g., SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL
CHAMPION 21 (2010).
3. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Righis, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977).
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something in his oeuvre for just about everyone-even those of us who
focus on constitutional structure more than rights and on Congress more
than the courts.
When I think of William Brennan, the opinion that comes to mind is
his dissent in the 1972 case Gravel v.'United States,4 which raises deep
and (to my mind, at least) interesting questions about the relationship
between the separation of powers and the American political public.
I. GRAVEL
First, some background on the Gravel case itself. It arose out of the
Vietnam War, and in particular out of the preparation and leak of the
Pentagon Papers. The Pentagon Papers is the name by which history
knows the top secret Pentagon study prepared between 1967 and 1969 and
officially titled "History of U.S. Decision Making Process on Vietnam
Policy." The complete study was 2.5 million words long and was bound
in forty-seven volumes.' Beginning in June 1971, the New York Times and
Washington Post began running a series of stories based on the Papers,
portions of which had been leaked to them by Daniel Ellsberg, a RAND
Corporation analyst who had been one of the researchers working on them.
The revelations were eye-opening, to say the least, disclosing a long
pattern of deception as to both the level of American engagement in
Indochina and the success (or lack thereof) of that engagement. As one
recent historical treatment put it, "[T]he Pentagon Papers revelation 'lent
credibility to and finally crystallized the growing consensus that the
Vietnam War was wrong and legitimized the radical critique of the war.'
The leak also began a period of militancy on the part of the press."6
This potential impact of the Papers was not lost on the Nixon
administration, which immediately went to court in both New York and
Washington to attempt to put a stop to their publication. After a flurried
two weeks of litigation, the Supreme Court held in New York Times v.
United States' that the newspapers could continue printing excerpts of the
4. 408 U.S. 606, 648 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5. See DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF THE
PENTAGON PAPERS CASE 2, 27 (1996); Neil Sheehan, Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study
Traces 3 Decades of Growing U.S. Involvement, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1971, at Al.
6. INSIDE THE PENTAGON PAPERS 183 (John Prados & Margaret Pratt Porter eds.,
2004).
7. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
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Pentagon Papers.8 (Justice Brennan, I should note, filed a concurring
opinion arguing for a free speech absolutist position.9 ) When lawyers talk
about the "Pentagon Papers case," they invariably mean to refer to New
York Times v. United States-and it's easy to see why. It's a story about
the heroism of the courts, and therefore about the heroism of lawyers. The
newspapers (represented by a titan of constitutional scholarship, Yale Law
Professor Alexander Bickel) stood up to the Nixon administration over a
matter that the administration had argued implicated national security
concerns, and the Court sided with the press."o It doesn't hurt, of course,
that we all know what happened next: Watergate took down the Nixon
presidency; the Vietnam War came to be widely, if not universally,
regarded as a mistake; and the publication of the Pentagon Papers did not
in fact have any of the dreadful consequences that the Nixon
administration prophesied."
But I'm not here today to talk about New York Times v. United States.
Instead, I want to talk about the other Pentagon Papers case. You see, the
night before the Supreme Court ruled in the New York Times case, and
while both newspapers were still holding in abeyance their article series
based on the Papers, in obedience to lower court orders, a very strange
Senate subcommittee hearing was held. After a Republican senator used a
procedural mechanism to keep him from taking the Senate floor, Mike
Gravel, a first-term Democratic senator from Alaska, convened a 9:45 p.m.
meeting of the Environment and Public Works Committee's
Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds.12 Gravel chaired the
subcommittee, and Senate rules allowed him to call a hearing at any time,
8. Id. at 714. The series of lower-court decisions leading up to the Supreme Court's
decision is traced in Josh Chafetz, Congress's Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 715, 746
(2012).
9. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 724-25 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he First
Amendment stands as an absolute bar to the imposition of judicial restraints in
circumstances of the kind presented by these cases.").
10. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, Ill
HARV. L. REV. 963, 974 n.43 (1998) (listing New York Times v. United States as one of
only eighteen "truly canonical" American constitutional law cases).
11. Indeed, Nixon's Solicitor General, Erwin Griswold, would later admit this last
point. See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, No Harm Was Done, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1991, at
El5 ("In hindsight, it is clear to me that no harm was done by publication of the Pentagon
Papers."); Erwin N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping, WASH. PosT, Feb. 15, 1989, at
A25 ("I have never seen any trace of a threat to the national security from the publication.
Indeed, I have never seen it even suggested that there was such an actual threat.").
12. MIKE GRAVEL & JOE LAURIA, A POLITICAL ODYSSEY 27-30 (2008).
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so long as the other subcommittee members were notified.13 Gravel
"notified" the other members by slipping notes under their office doors
less than an hour before the hearing began.1 4 Unsurprisingly, he was the
only member of the subcommittee who showed up to the hearing; he
brought Representative John Goodchild Dow of New York, an anti-war
Democrat, as the "witness" whose testimony occasioned the hearing." As
Gravel later reported, the hearing played out as follows:
"Congressman Dow," I said, "great to have you here,
appreciate hearing your views. What is it you want? What is it you
need?"
Dow said, "I'd like a federal building in my district."
And I said, "Let me stop you right there. I certainly believe that
is a worthy desire for you to have for your constituency, but I gotta
tell you we got no money. And the reason we don't have any
money is because of what is happening in Vietnam. What is
happening in Vietnam is a mistake and I've got a few comments
to make about how we got into that mistake."l6
Gravel then read aloud from the Pentagon Papers for over three hours,
until he broke down in tears a little after 1:00 a.m. while reading about the
effects of the war on both Vietnamese civilians and American soldiers.17
He entered thousands of remaining pages into the subcommittee record;
his staff stayed up until the wee hours of the morning photocopying the
"subcommittee record" and handing it to reporters." The Court ruled in
the New York Times case about twelve hours later, but by that point the cat
was irretrievably out of the bag.
But even after the Court's ruling the next day, the saga wasn't quite
over. It is little remembered that the New York Times case left open the
possibility of post hoc criminal prosecution. Twojustices in the majority-
Justices Stewart and White-wrote separately to note that, in White's
words, "failure by the Government to justify prior restraints does not
measure its constitutional entitlement to a conviction for criminal
publication. That the Government mistakenly chose to proceed by
13. Id. at 30.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 36.
18. Id. at 38.
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injunction does not mean that it could not successfully proceed in another
way."" Three other justices-Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan
and Blackmun-dissented, arguing that the lower court injunctions against
publication should have been upheld.20 Add those together, and that's five
justices open to the possibility of criminalizing the disclosure of the
Pentagon Papers. And, indeed, the Nixon administration did prosecute
Daniel Ellsberg, who had leaked the Papers to both Gravel and the media,
and Anthony Russo, who had helped Ellsberg copy the Papers.2 1 Those
charges were ultimately dismissed, not because of any free press concerns
but because of government misconduct in the investigation.22
Senator Gravel soon became convinced that fear of prosecution and
press timidity resulted in too little of the Papers being published.23 So he
arranged to publish them himself-technically, to publish "the 4,100-page
subcommittee record"-with Beacon Press.24 In the course of the
subsequent grand jury investigation into the leaking of the Papers,
Gravel's aide Leonard Rodberg was subpoenaed, as was the director of
another press with which Gravel had tried to publish the Papers. Gravel
intervened with a motion to quash the subpoenas on Speech or Debate
Clause grounds, and the case eventually worked its way up to the Supreme
Court.25
The Court, per Justice White, issued two central holdings. First, it was
"incontrovertible" that Senator Gravel himself would be "protect[ed] ...
from criminal or civil liability and from questioning elsewhere than in the
Senate, with respect to the events occurring at the subcommittee
hearing."26 And, crucially, Gravel's immunity under the Speech or Debate
Clause must extend to Rodberg, too:
[I]t is literally impossible, in view of the complexities of the
modem legislative process, with Congress almost constantly in
19. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 733 (White, J., joined by
Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 730 (Stewart, J., joined by White, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 748 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 752 (Harlan, J., joined by Burger, C.J.,
and Blackmun, J., dissenting).
21. See RUDENSTINE, supra note 5, at 341-43.
22. See id. at 342-43.
23. GRAVEL & LAURIA, supra note 12, at 49-50.
24. Id. at 50-51; see also 5 THE PENTAGON PAPERS: THE SENATOR GRAVEL EDITION
314-15 (1972) (describing the text of the Gravel edition).
25. JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS'S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 216 (2017).
26. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615 (1972).
2017] 313
Oklahoma City University Law Review
session and matters of legislative concern constantly proliferating,
for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks
without the help of aides and assistants; . . . the day-to-day work
of such aides is so critical to the Members' performance that they
must be treated as the latter's alter egos; and . .. if they are not so
recognized, the central role of the Speech or Debate Clause-to
prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and
accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary-will inevitably
be diminished and frustrated.27
This holding, that a senator's aide shares his boss's immunity from being
forced to testify about core legislative activity, was unanimous.28
The Court's second holding in Gravel, however, was more
contentious. While the "events occurring at the subcommittee hearing"
were privileged,29 the arrangements to have the Papers published were not.
This was because, in White's view,
private publication by Senator Gravel through the cooperation of
Beacon Press was in no way essential to the deliberations of the
Senate; nor does questioning as to private publication threaten the
integrity or independence of the Senate by impermissibly
exposing its deliberations to executive influence. The Senator had
conducted his hearings; the record and any report that was
forthcoming were available both to his committee and the Senate.
... We cannot but conclude that the Senator's arrangements with
Beacon Press were not part and parcel of the legislative process.30
In other words, in the Court's view, the "legislative process" was limited
to legislators' interactions with one another; their interactions in the
broader public sphere3' were something different.
It was on this point that three justices dissented.3 2 Writing for those
27. Id. at 616-17 (citation omitted).
28. See id. at 629-33 (Stewart, J., dissenting in part); id. at 633 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); id. at 648 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 615 (majority opinion).
30. Id. at 625-26.
31. On the concept of the public sphere in the separation of powers, see CHAFETZ,
supra note 25, at 15-26.
32. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 633 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 648-49 (Brennan, J., joined
by Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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three, Justice Brennan insisted that the majority had "so restrict[ed] the
privilege of speech or debate as to endanger the continued performance of
legislative tasks that are vital to the workings of our democratic system."3 3
In particular, he chastised the majority for "exclud[ing] from the sphere of
protected legislative activity a function that I had supposed lay at the heart
of our democratic system. I speak, of course, of the legislator's duty to
inform the public about matters affecting the administration of
government."3 4 He noted that congressional hearings "are not confined to
gathering information for internal distribution, but are often widely
publicized, sometimes televised, as a means of alerting the electorate to
matters of public import and concern."" Neither "history" nor "reason,"
he concluded, supported the Court's conclusion that "the informing
function is not privileged merely because it is not necessary to the internal
deliberations of Congress."36 And for Brennan, this failure on the Court's
part implicated the nation's deepest democratic values:
What is at stake is the right of an elected representative to inform,
and the public to be informed, about matters relating directly to
the workings of our Government. The dialogue between Congress
and people has been recognized, from the days of our founding,
as one of the necessary elements of a representative system. We
should not retreat from that view merely because, in the course of
that dialogue, information may be revealed that is embarrassing to
the other branches of government or violates their notions of
necessary secrecy. A Member of Congress who exceeds the
bounds of propriety in performing this official task may be called
to answer by the other Members of his chamber.3 7
For Brennan, then, interacting with the people was not peripheral to a
legislator's job; it was central to it, and therefore deserving of the highest
protections.
33. Id. at 648 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 649.
35. Id. at 650.
36. Id. at 652.
37. Id. at 661-62.
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II. BRINGING THE PUBLIC INTO THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
It is this divergence between Brennan and his colleagues in the
majority that I would like to spend the rest of my time exploring. For the
majority, the separation of powers is all about how officials embedded
within the governing structure interact with one another. The Speech or
Debate Clause, on this view, protects core legislative activities from
interference by the other branches-even when those activities are carried
out by an aide, rather than by the legislator herself. But, crucially, for the
majority, core legislative activities are limited to activities in which
legislators (or their aides) interact with other legislators (or their aides).
The majority is focused on inward-facing legislative behavior;3 8 outward-
facing activity, like talking to members of the public, is "not part and
parcel of the legislative process."39 For Brennan, this is upside down:
Representative democracy requires a free-flowing exchange of
information between legislators and the public. Interference with this
information flow, just as much as interference with the information flow
within legislative institutions, undermines core constitutional values.
Brennan's point is not necessarily the most intuitive one. Today, we
tend to think about so-called structural constitutionalism-that is,
federalism and the separation of powers-as being about the interactions
between large, impersonal governing institutions. Interactions between
agents of the state and the public seem to fall into the domain of rights-
based constitutionalism. And when we talk, teach, and write about the
Constitution, we tend to keep those two things separate 4 0-indeed, at some
law schools, they're taught in different classes. But from our republic's
earliest days, we've also understood that the two cannot be so neatly
separated. The Declaration of Independence drew this connection
explicitly in its preamble: After asserting that "all men . . . are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness," it went on to translate this claim of
natural right into one of institutional design.
38. Elsewhere, I have referred to this as a "geographical" conception of the scope of
the privilege-that is, one that "focuses on absolutely protecting from interference by any
outside power actions that take place within the physical confines of[a legislative house]."
JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY'S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC
NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 5 (2007).
39. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 626.
40. There are, of course, exceptions. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights as
a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
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[T]o secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. [And]
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these
ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it; and to
institute new Government, laying its foundation on such
principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.41
In this short passage, we have a mashup of three distinct concepts: liberal
rights (life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness), republican freedom (the
right of the people to alter, abolish, and reinstitute their government), and
institutional design (restructuring the government according to such
principles as shall seem best to the people). For Jefferson, the three were
inseparable-although we certainly should not pass this by without
pausing to note that these three principles appeared to Jefferson and his
colleagues to sit more harmoniously precisely because of the exclusion of
most persons from the political people.42
A little over a decade after Independence, Publius picked up on this
theme, explaining how institutional mechanics, the stuff of structural
constitutionalism, might be harnessed in the service of rights protection.
In Federalist 28, Alexander Hamilton explored this connection in the
context of federalism:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general
government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations
of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition
towards the general government. The people, by throwing
themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate.
If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other
as the instrument of redress.43
In other words, federalism functions as a safeguard of individual rights by
creating distinct power centers, competing for the affections of the people.
41. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
42. Aziz Rana has written eloquently about the ways in which republican self-rule in
the early republic was predicated upon the subordination and exclusion from the political
people of members of marginalized groups. See generally Az=z RANA, THE Two FACES OF
AMERICAN FREEDOM 1-175 (2010).
43. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 176-77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
Signet Classic ed. 2003) (1961).
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If one level of government becomes oppressive, on this view, the other
will have an incentive to check it, thereby becoming the people's hero and
winning more power vis-a-vis the other level of government in the long
run.44 James Madison made a similar point in the separation-of-powers
context in Federalist 51: After explaining that the system was designed so
as to encourage "[a] mbition . . . to counteract ambition," he told his readers
why this was important: "[T]he constant aim is to divide and arrange the
several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other-
that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the
public rights." 45 Again, structural design is presented as protecting the
rights of the public.
Unfortunately, in present-day discussions of the separation of powers,
we seem to have lost this sense of what the powers are separatedfor. We
generally talk about them as if they only regulate the dealings of powerful
governing institutions with one another-the federal government with the
states, in the context of federalism, and the branches of the federal
government with one another, in the context of the separation of powers.
By contrast, Jefferson, Hamilton, and Madison understood these structural
provisions to be public-facing. They were there precisely to protect the
rights and interests of the broader political community.
I propose that we take our cue from Justice Brennan and try to bring
the public back in to our structural constitutional analysis. In what remains
of my time, I will offer snapshots of a couple of areas in which thinking
about separation of powers in terms of the institutions' interactions with
the public would give us a different take on important constitutional issues.
A. Speech or Debate
To begin, let's stick with the constitutional provision that was at issue
in Gravel, the Speech or Debate Clause. Perhaps not surprisingly, given
his authorship of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson, the
great parliamentarian of the early republic, shared Brennan's expansive
44. I've analyzed this dynamic in the federalism context in Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity
in Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 1084, 1092-98 (2011).
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 43, at 319 (James Madison). Daryl Levinson
and Rick Pildes have influentially insisted that the development of political parties in the
early republic rendered this Madisonian conception of the separation of powers almost
immediately obsolete. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties,
Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006). For my response to their argument, see
CHAFETZ, supra note 25, at 28-35.
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reading of the speech or debate privilege. Consider the Cabell affair. In
1797, a federal grand jury sitting in Richmond issued a presentment
against Samuel J. Cabell, a Republican who represented Virginia in the
House of Representatives.46 Cabell had written a circular letter to his
constituents that pulled no punches in attacking the foreign policy of the
late Washington administration, policy largely continued by the new
Adams administration, and the presentment charged Cabell with common
law seditious libel.47 In other words, the grand jury sought to initiate
criminal proceedings against a member of the U.S. House of
Representatives based on the content of a letter that he sent to his
constituents.
In an anonymously authored petition to the Virginia House of
Delegates, Jefferson-who was Adams's vice president, Cabell's
constituent, and the leader of Cabell's party-wrote that
in order to give to the will of the people the influence it ought to
have, and the information which may enable them to exercise it
usefully, . . . their representatives, in the discharge of their
functions, should be free from the cognizance or coercion of the
co-ordinate branches, Judiciary and Executive; and . . . their
communications with their constituents should of right, as of duty
also, be free, full, and unawed by any.4 8
But the presentment threatened that free intercourse between
representative and constituent, because it threatened to interpose the
judiciary. This, Jefferson noted, would "put the representative into
jeopardy of criminal prosecution, of vexation, expense, and punishment
before the Judiciary, if his communications, public or private, do not
exactly square with their ideas of fact or right, or with their designs of
wrong."4 9 In short, it would "put the legislative department under the feet
of the Judiciary, [leaving] us, indeed, the shadow, but [taking] away the
substance of representation.""o
Jefferson's initial recommendation was that the Virginia House of
Delegates impeach and punish the offending grand jurors, but the final
46. CHAFETZ, supra note 25, at 211-12.
47. See id. at 212.
48. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Petition to Virginia House ofDelegates (Aug. 1797), in 8 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 322, 322 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904).
49. Id. at 326.
50. Id.
2017] 319
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petition presented in the House of Delegates toned the request down
somewhat." Still, the House ordered a thousand copies of the petition to
be printed and distributed, and it resolved that the presentment was "a
violation of the fundamental principles of representation, incompatible
with that independence between the co-ordinate branches of government,
meditated both by the general and state constitutions."52 Cabell was never
prosecuted on the presentment. 53
One might think of the Cabell affair as prefiguring Republican
reactions to the Alien and Sedition Acts, which became law about half a
year after the Virginia House of Delegates' resolution.54 The chief
reactions to those acts, too, came in the form of resolutions passed by state
legislatures: the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 and 1799,
secretly authored by Jefferson and Madison, respectively.55 One reason
(among many) that it made sense to have state legislatures take the lead in
protesting the Alien and Sedition Acts was the long history of free
legislative speech and debate. It is true that the federal Constitution's
Speech or Debate Clause did not apply to state legislatures, but the
privilege had a long pedigree in Anglo-American constitutionalism, 56 and
it would have been politically treacherous, to say the least, to federally
prosecute state legislators for introducing or voting on these resolutions.
By contrast, protesting those laws in other venues-say, in the press or in
open public meetings-might well have led to prosecution under the
Sedition Act itself.57 And the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions were, of
course, intended for public consumption: As one leading historical
treatment puts it, they "served as efficient rallying devices for Republicans
from Vermont to Georgia,"5 and "were an integral part of the Republican
national campaign" in 1800.59 We remember that election as the
"Republican Revolution" of 1800 because of the success with which
Jefferson, Madison, and their compatriots rallied public support: 60
51. CHAFETZ, supra note 25, at 212.
52. Quoted in id. at 213.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. Id.; Chafetz, supra note 44, at 1107-11.
56. That pedigree is traced in CHAFETZ, supra note 25, at 201-15.
57. See id. at 213.
58. Adrienne Koch & Harry Ammon, The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An
Episode in Jefferson's and Madison's Defense of Civil Liberties, 5 WM. & MARY Q. (3d
ser.) 145, 176 (1948).
59. Id. at 170.
60. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV.
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Notice that in the Cabell affair, like in the Gravel case, what was at
issue was what we might anachronistically (at least for Cabell) call the
right of members of Congress candidly to discuss matters of national
security with their constituents. For the Adams administration, Cabell was
interfering with the conduct of international diplomacy at a time when the
United States needed carefully to navigate between the competing
demands of Old World powers. For the Nixon administration, Gravel was
interfering with the conduct of a war at a time of conflict between the two
great superpowers, one of which was the United States. In both cases, the
executive branch was asserting unilateral authority to determine the
interests of the American state and to threaten criminal sanction against
other officeholders who offered a competing account.
It is important to understand these conflicts in precisely those terms:
as conflicts over who gets to construct, define, and delimit American
national interests. All too often, we talk in terms of whether or not
"secrets" are "leaked." This treats the secrecy of secrets as something that
somehow inheres in the information itself-it is either secret information
or it isn't. But secrecy isn't a natural category; it's a political one.6 '
Information gets coded as "secret" because some political actor has chosen
to so code it. That choice is made in the context of some particular
construction of the national interest, and it is generally made in furtherance
of that construction. To accept that coding is thus to buy into that
construction-or, at the very least, to deny others the resources necessary
to challenge that construction.
Already in the early 1970s, there were significant concerns about
overclassification-indeed, it was a theme of Justice Douglas's dissent in
Gravel.6 2 But if overclassification was worth worrying about in the early
1970s,63 it was nothing compared to today. As Steven Aftergood wrote in
2009,
L. REv. 885, 934 (1985) ("[T]he Resolutions were triumphantly vindicated, at least in
Republican eyes, by the results of the election of 1800, in which the Republicans seized
control of both Congress and the Presidency from the Federalists.").
61. I've made this point before. See CHAFETZ, supra note 25, at 224; Josh Chafetz,
Whose Secrets?, 127 HARv. L. REv. F. 86, 86 (2013).
62. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 637-40 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
63. Indeed, some were worrying about it as early as the 1950s. See Steven Aftergood,
Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 399, 400
(2009) (quoting a 1956 Defense Department report claiming that "overclassification has
reached serious proportions").
2017] 321
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By 2008, classification activity had increased to a total of more
than 23 million classification actions per year. The most recent
reported cost of protecting classified information in government
and industry was a record annual high of $9.9 billion in 2007.
Untold billions of pages of government records, some dating back
to World War I, have remained inaccessible to the public on
asserted national security grounds, and fateful government
deliberations on questions of war and peace, human rights, and
domestic surveillance have increasingly moved beyond public
ken. 64
Moreover, as David Pozen noted in a groundbreaking 2013 article,
massive overclassification is combined with a regime in which executive-
branch actors routinely leak such information to advance their own
agendas, without fear of prosecution, because, after all, it is the executive
branch that prosecutes.6 ' However, when leaks that are not in the interests
of the executive branch occur, the government has a wide array of
draconian penalties with which to go after the leakers6 6-just ask Chelsea
Manning. Moreover, as Pozen noted, "[n]o court has ever accepted a
defense of improper classification" in an Espionage Act prosecution. 67 in
short, the executive branch fosters a culture of massive overclassification,
combined with a permissive attitude toward leaks that promote executive-
branch interests and a harshly punitive attitude toward leaks that do not.
This, of course, is a recipe for a public political discourse that is
systematically skewed toward the executive branch's position.
A speech or debate privilege that focuses only on the interactions
among members of Congress and their staffs does something to combat
this-but not much. If members of Congress can talk only to one another
about what they know, then they have little hope of shifting views in the
public at large-and it is through such public contestation that the
branches gain or lose power vis-d-vis one another.6 1 Moreover, if members
of Congress are unable to go public with what they know for fear of being
haled before a court, then insiders with access to information-people like
64. Id. at 402 (footnotes omitted).
65. David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and
Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013).
66. See id. at 522-27.
67. Id. at 523.
68. This is a major theme of CHAFETZ, supra note 25. See especially id. at 15-26.
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Daniel Ellsberg-have less of a reason to give that information to
members of Congress in the first place.
By contrast, a speech or debate privilege that robustly protects
members' communication with the public goes a lot further toward
contesting the executive branch's attempt at monopolizing the
construction of the national interest. Consider, in this regard, that it was
agitation by Republicans like Cabell, Jefferson, and Madison during the
Adams administration that contributed to the public's turn against the
Federalists, leading to the Republican Revolution of 1800. And the release
of the Pentagon Papers, among other things, contributed to the public's
turn against the Vietnam War in the 1970s. In each case, legislators used
their privileged positions to influence public discourse in such a way as to
contest the construction of American national interests being put forward
by the executive. When Justice Brennan insisted that the "dialogue
between Congress and people" must be protected, even-or perhaps
especially-when "in the course of that dialogue, information may be
revealed that is embarrassing to the other branches of government or
violates their notions of necessary secrecy,"6 9 he was insisting on the
availability of a counternarrative.
Of course, Justice Brennan dissented in Gravel. The Court's majority
continued pressing in the opposite direction: Seven years later, in
Hutchinson v. Proxmire,70 it held that a senator could be sued for
defamation for the contents of a press release, constituent newsletter, and
television interview, all of which referred to material he had discussed in
a floor speech. (Justice Brennan wrote a three-sentence dissent, simply
citing to his Gravel dissent.") Nevertheless, two factors have combined to
make the majority opinions in Gravel and Hutchinson largely untenable.
First, as a result of both congressional choices and changes in technology,
congressional materials are far more widely and easily available today
than they were in 1971. C-SPAN now broadcasts floor proceedings in both
chambers as well as a great many committee meetings. Nearly all open
committee meetings are also broadcast live over the internet. C-SPAN's
entire video archive is available for free online, as are recent volumes of
the Congressional Record. Many congressional committees also post
online the text of testimony and reports. Put simply-and with the
important but quite limited exception of closed committee hearings-the
69. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 661-62 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
71. Id. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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line between something that is internal to Congress and something that is
public has significantly eroded. The second major development is that a
certain kind of free speech absolutism has become the norm among both
liberals and conservatives.72 This can be seen in the present-day lionization
of New York Times v. United States-which, recall, was a 6-3 decision
when it came down. But it is hard to imagine any judge in 2017 voting in
favor of prior restraint. As a result, media outlets feel perfectly free to take
this increasingly available congressional material and run with it.
Consider the case of Henry Gonzalez, a Democrat from Texas who
served in the House of Representatives from the early 1960s through the
late 1990s. In 1992, he read aloud from classified documents on the floor
of the House and placed a number of those documents into the legislative
record. Those documents indicated that, contrary to the George H.W. Bush
administration's claims, senior administration officials had been cozying
up to Saddam Hussein's regime as late as a few months before Iraq's 1990
invasion of Kuwait.73 After a couple of months of such disclosures, the
press finally took notice and began reporting on Gonzalez's information.74
A Republican resolution requesting that the Ethics Committee investigate
Gonzalez failed on a party line vote;75 there was no serious talk of
prosecuting either him or the newspapers that ran with his revelations.
More recently still, consider the roles played by Senators Jay
Rockefeller, Ron Wyden, and Mark Udall, all Democrats who served on
the Intelligence Committee, in disclosing information about the operations
of the national security apparatus under the Bush II and Obama
administrations.76 In 2004, Rockefeller and Wyden announced on the floor
that they were opposing the conference report on the intelligence
authorization bill based on an objection to one unnamed acquisitions
program.77 They urged their colleagues to come in for a closed briefing on
the program. 78 But by making their initial plea in open session, they set
into motion what Seth Kreimer has termed the "ecology of
72. For a discussion of how this came about, see STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, WHAT'S WRONG
WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 159-83 (2016).
73. CHAFETZ, supra note 25, at 219-20.
74. See, e.g., George Lardner Jr., Gonzalez's Iraq Expose: Hill Chairman Details U.S.
Prewar Courtship, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1992, at Al; William Safire, Opinion, Bush's
Lavoro Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1992, at Al7.
75. CHAFETZ, supra note 25, at 220.
76. See id. at 220-22.
77. Id. at 220.
78. Id.
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transparency" 79: within a week, the New York Times reported on what the
program was, and within a few years, the program was quietly
terminated." Similarly, in 2011, Wyden and Udall announced on the
Senate floor that the Obama administration had adopted secret expansive
interpretations of portions of the PATRIOT Act dealing with domestic
surveillance.' That prompted the ACLU and the New York Times to file
FOIA requests, which led to some disclosure by the government, but not
enough in their view.8 2 In an attempt to pry more information loose, the
ACLU and the Times filed suit; when the government moved to dismiss
the suits, Senators Wyden and Udall released an open letter to Attorney
General Holder laying out their concerns about the secret interpretation-
and, in the process, dropping a few more tantalizing hints about the
surveillance program that was running pursuant to that interpretation." In
2013, the Snowden revelations made the details of the surveillance
operation clear, and the ACLU again filed suit.84 In 2015, the Second
Circuit held that the surveillance program was illegal. The following
month the relevant provision of the PATRIOT Act was allowed to sunset;
when it was subsequently renewed, it came with much tighter limitations
on the NSA's surveillance authority.86 Once again, a revelation by
members of Congress, under the protection of the speech or debate
privilege, set the ecology of transparency in motion, resulting in a more
robust public discourse that challenged the ways in which the executive
was constructing and pursuing the national interest. These challenges
ultimately resulted in deviations from the executive's preferred policy-
and this all occurred in realms conventionally coded as "national security,"
where the executive's claim to unfettered authority is often thought to be
at an apex.
Nor is freedom of speech or debate the only context in which bringing
the public back in might give us a different view of separation;of-powers
79. Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of
Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011 (2008); Seth F. Kreimer, The Ecology of
Transparency Reloaded, in TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY: THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT AND BEYOND (David Pozen & Michael Schudson eds., forthcoming 2018).
80. CHAFETZ, supra note 25, at 220-21.
81. Id. at 221.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 826 (2d Cir. 2015).
86. CHAFETZ, supra note 25, at 221-22.
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controversies. Consider congressional oversight hearings.
B. Hearings
With oversight, too, we tend to speak as if the only relevant
relationship is that between governing institutions-here, between the
overseer (a congressional committee) and the overseen entity (generally
some organ of the executive branch). Did the inquiry turn up new facts?
Did it lead to the enactment of new legislation or other concrete actions by
Congress in response to the facts discovered? Those things, we frequently
hear, characterize real oversight-anything else is just a political circus.
But recall again Justice Brennan's insistence in Gravel that congressional
hearings "are not confined to gathering information for internal
distribution, but are often widely publicized, sometimes televised, as a
means of alerting the electorate to matters of public import and concern."8 7
Hearings are a mechanism for discovering facts, developing legislative
proposals, considering the suitability of nominees, etc. But they are also a
form of political theater and a means of communicating with the public-
and these are functions to be encouraged, not lamented.
Consider the Senate munitions inquiry of the mid-1930s, led by
Senator Gerald Nye, a Republican from North Dakota. The Nye
Committee conducted nearly a hundred hearings and interviewed more
than two hundred witnesses in its investigation into the links between the
munitions industry (the so-called "merchants of death") and the American
entry into World War I.' Although the Senate committee never
demonstrated its original hypothesis-that the munitions manufacturers
had deliberately maneuvered the United States into war-it did begin to
develop a substantial critique of what would later be called the military-
industrial complex. 9 That critique was instrumental in mobilizing an
isolationist bloc that significantly complicated Roosevelt's attempts to
bring the United States into World War 11.90 As political scientist John C.
Donovan noted shortly after the Second World War, the munitions inquiry
both sprang from and fed into a "popular disillusionment concerning
87. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 650 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. RICHARD A. BAKER, 200 NOTABLE DAYS: SENATE STORIES, 1787 to 2002, at 141
(2006).
89. MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
185, 190, 207 (2013).
90. See id. at 185, 211, 250.
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American participation in the First World War." 91 As a consequence, "the
isolationist groups, within and outside Congress, were strong enough and
clever enough and were in a sufficiently strategic position to win
substantial concessions from the administration from 1935 through
1939,",92 including of course the Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1937. Only
after war broke out in Europe was FDR able to get out from under
neutrality legislation; even then, Congress insisted on the "cash-and-
carry" requirement for arms shipments. 93 And even when lend-lease
replaced cash-and-carry in 1941, Roosevelt perceived the need to justify it
to Congress in language sounding in neutrality, as Mariah Zeisberg has
shown. 94 None of these policies were fully effective in constraining
Roosevelt,95 but neither were they mere parchment barriers-there is, after
all, only so much that a president can do surreptitiously-and the
munitions inquiry played a significant role in developing the political
circumstances that led to the isolationist pressure in Congress and in the
public at large.
Some of what the Nye Committee accomplished sprang from what it
found, of course, but note that it did not actually succeed in turning up a
smoking gun-it found no direct evidence that the munitions industry had
pushed the United States into war. Nevertheless, it-managed to make a
compelling argument to much of the public that World War I had been
something other than a glorious fight to make the world safe for
democracy, and that public persuasion had real political consequences,
making it harder for Roosevelt to move the United States toward entry into
World War II.
Once high-profile hearings began to be televised, their use as tools of
communicating with, and attempting to influence, the public became even
more pronounced. As a result, the way in which hearings were staged
became ever more important. Consider the rise and fall of Joseph
McCarthy. McCarthy's rise to national prominence was solidly aided by
91. John C. Donovan, Congressional Isolationists and the Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 3
WORLD POL. 299, 300 (1951).
92. Id. at 303.
93. Id. at 305. See also OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE
INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW A RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD 177
(2017).
94. See ZEISBERG, supra note 89, at 85-87; HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 93, at
179.
95. See ZEISBERG, supra note 89, at 62-63 (listing actions FDR took between 1938 and
1941 that were aimed at advancing U.S. intervention in the war).
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his chairmanship of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
in 1953 and 1954. He used this perch to make increasingly dramatic, and
largely unfounded, accusations of Communist subversion within groups
ranging from the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Federal
Communications Commission" to the Voice of America97 to the CIA and
the Atomic Energy Commission." Shortly after McCarthy took over the
Investigations Subcommittee, conservative Democrat Allen Ellender of
Louisiana complained, "He wants to televise all these hearings.. .. He is
trying to overdo this."" McCarthy's strategy paid off handsomely for him:
By the middle of 1953, some observers considered him the most powerful
man in the Senate, despite the fact that he had only been there for six
years.00
But then McCarthy overreached: He went after the army. He didn't
turn up much, but the army punched back, making it known that Roy
Cohn, the subcommittee's chief counsel, had repeatedly used his (and
implicitly his boss's) influence to attempt to get special treatment for G.
David Schine, a consultant to the subcommittee who had been drafted into
the army.o' The subcommittee determined that hearings on the matter
were called for, and South Dakota Republican Senator Karl Mundt took
over chairing the subcommittee for the purposes of what came to be known
as the Army-McCarthy Hearings.10 2 The hearings lasted for just over two
months, with a total of thirty-six sessions.'03 ABC and the DuMont
network covered the proceedings live throughout the two-month period;
NBC and CBS offered daily forty-five-minute summaries of the
hearings.10 4 The climactic moment came on June 9, 1954, after the nation
had already been treated to weeks of televised depictions of McCarthy
"dominat[ing] the proceedings, producing doctored evidence to indict his
foes, interrupting to raise a 'point of order,' giving lectures, and making
crude, personal attacks upon the participants,"'0 in the words of one
96. See THOMAS C. REEVES, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JOE MCCARTHY 466-67 (1982).
97. See id. at 476-91.
98. See id. at 505.
99. Id. at 466.
100. See id. at 493.
101. See id. at 536-37.
102. See id. at 579.
103. Michael Gauger, Flickering Images: Live Television Coverage and Viewership of
the Army-McCarthy Hearings, 67 HISTORIAN 678, 681 (2005).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 678.
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historian. Joseph Welch of the law firm Hale and Dorr (now WilmerHale)
had been hired as outside counsel by the army; violating an agreement that
Cohn and Welch had struck, McCarthy publicly attacked a junior lawyer
at Hale and Dorr-one who was not involved with the Senate hearings at
all-for his past membership in a Communist-linked group.106 Appearing
close to tears at the attack on his young associate, Welch demanded of
McCarthy, "Have you no sense of decency, sir, at long last? Have you left
no sense of decency?"' A shocked silence was followed by applause; in
most historical accounts, this widely viewed exchange marked a pivotal
moment in the decline of McCarthy and McCarthyism more generally.os
Less than two months later, Vermont Republican Senator Ralph
Flanders introduced a censure resolution against McCarthy."o' The Senate
impaneled a special, six-member committee, consisting of three senior
Democrats and three senior Republicans and chaired by Utah Republican
Arthur Watkins.'o After numerous hearings and taking substantial
amounts of testimony, the Watkins Committee reported mere days after
the 1954 elections, which swung both houses of Congress to the
Democrats-at least partially in reaction against McCarthyism. "1 The
report recommended censure across two broad categories of McCarthy's
conduct; on the Senate floor, one of those categories was dropped but
replaced with another charge-that of McCarthy's abuse of the Watkins
Committee itself.112 The Senate voted to censure McCarthy by a vote of
67-22.113 The censure was heavily covered in the press, with the New York
Times editorializing that the Senate had "done much to redeem itself in the
eyes of the American people and to give new assurance of its faithfulness
to the principles of orderly democratic government and individual liberty
under law," and the Washington Post asserting that the censure was "a
vindication of the Senate's honor."I14 The censure destroyed what was left
of McCarthy's political prominence and influence. Within three years, he
106. Id. at 678, 679 & n.2.
107. Id. at 678.
108. Id. at 678-79. Gauger's treatment is generally skeptical of the magnitude of the
hearings' impact, but even he recognizes that, for example, self-identified moderates'
support for McCarthy decreased as they watched more of the hearings. See id. at 683.
109. CHAFETZ, supra note 25, at 264-65.
110. Id. at 265.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (first quoting Editorial, Censure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1954, at 26; then quoting
Editorial, Judgment of the Senate, WASH. PosT, Dec. 3, 1954, at 20).
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had drunk himself to death." 5
With McCarthy, we can see the importance of the public nature of
committee hearings throughout. It was largely through the publicity he
garnered for his subcommittee hearings that McCarthy gained prominence
and influence in the first place. But it was also through a skillful
performance at the Army-McCarthy Hearings that Joseph Welch was able
to begin to turn the tide, to show that it was possible to stand up to
McCarthy and survive. This in turn emboldened other opponents of
McCarthy to step forward-people like Ralph Flanders, who introduced
the censure resolution. And the skillful management of the public image
of the resulting Watkins Committee-including the fact of its bipartisan
composition, its almost ostentatiously careful and thorough fact-finding
procedures, and its exhaustive final report-allowed it to be held up in the
press as providing a good reason for public confidence in the Senate's
censure of McCarthy. As anti-McCarthyite journalist Alan Barth put it in
1955, the Watkins Committee hearings were "in almost every important
respect the antithesis of the procedure followed" by the McCarthy-led
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations." 6 Again, bringing the public
in is central to understanding how these hearings did the work that they
did.
Finally, consider another set of hearings that captivated the public: the
hearings on Ronald Reagan's nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme
Court in 1987. A young University of Chicago law professor named Elena
Kagan would later write that the Bork hearings "captivated and involved
[the] citizenry in a way that, given the often arcane nature of the subject
matter, could not have been predicted.""'7 But the "captivating" nature of
the Bork hearings wasn't just something that unexpectedly arose: It was a
result of conscious political choices to engage and involve the citizenry.
Put simply, the Democratic-controlled Senate Judiciary Committee did a
masterful job of staging these hearings so as to make the case for Bork's
unfitness to serve on the Court. But before we even get to the hearings, we
have to bring the public in-you see, Democrats were only running the
hearings because they had triumphed in the 1986 midterm elections,
picking up a net of eight Senate seats and taking control of the chamber
115. Id at 266.
116. ALAN BARTH, GOVERNMENT BY INVESTIGATION 210 (1955).
117. Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 940
(1995).
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for the first time in the Reagan presidency."' And by the time of the Bork
hearings, the Iran-Contra affair was a full-blown scandal-indeed, the
Bork hearings began shortly after the Iran-Contra hearings wrapped up-
and Reagan's approval ratings were accordingly suffering." 9 This set the
stage for Democratic pushback against Reagan's nominee. In polling taken
before, during, and after the confirmation hearings, one can see both
familiarity with Bork and opposition to him steadily increasing.'2 0
A lot went in to this change: First, Senate Democrats and outside allied
groups "had to accurately ascertain that there was a public willingness to
endure a protracted fight over Bork's nomination."' 2 ' Reagan's low
popularity was undoubtedly one factor that convinced them that there was.
Then they had to construct the hearings so as to take advantage of that
willingness-so as to actually convince the public that Bork was unfit. At
the same time, the administration, congressional Republican leadership,
and outside supporters were engaged in attempting to construct a
counternarrative-one that showed Bork as a suitable justice. The more
intense this fight got, the more it signaled to the media that it should pay
close attention, and more media attention signaled to the public that this
was a high-stakes fight, one worth following.' 22 With the audience in place
and the stakes signaled, the Democrats then used their control over the
structure of the hearings to successfully paint Bork as an out-of-touch,
extremist ideologue. With the public's decisive turn against Bork, it
became highly unlikely that he would be confirmed by a Democratic
Senate, and indeed his nomination failed-first in committee by a vote of
9-5, and then on the floor by a vote of 58-42.123 This is in stark contrast
to the unanimous confirmation of Bork's fellow originalist, Antonin
Scalia, only a year earlier.1 24 While there are other differences between the
Bork and Scalia nominations, one central one is that Republicans still
controlled the Senate when Scalia was nominated, which denied
118. CHAFETZ, supra note 25, at 23; see also Josh Chafetz, The Supreme Court, 2016
Term-Essay: Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for a Usable
Past, 131 HARv. L. REV. 96, 126 (2017).
119. CHAFETZ, supra note 25, at 23.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 318
(2009).
124. See Chafetz, supra note 18, at 126.
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Democrats any opportunity to structure the hearings so as to dent Scalia's
public standing. 125 Once again, if we leave the public out, we miss a lot of
what was really going on.
Of course, none of this is to suggest that any particular congressional
hearing will be well-structured so as to win over the public. For one thing,
the public might simply not care, and the members running the hearings
may be unable to convince it to sit up and pay attention. For another thing,
if the public is watching, those running the hearing might flub it: McCarthy
obviously flubbed the Army-McCarthy hearings; on at least some
accounts, the Iran-Contra hearings were mismanaged; and more recently
the Benghazi hearings did not seem to have the impact on Hillary Clinton's
public standing that House Republicans had hoped for. But all of these
hearings were clearly aimed, in large part, at swaying public opinion, just
as were other, more successful uses of the tool. To overlook or downplay
this function of congressional hearings is to overlook or downplay much
of how American policy is made.
III. CONCLUSION
We're now in a position to see, I think, that Justice Brennan's concern
about "exclud[ing]" "the legislator's duty to inform the public about
matters affecting the administration of government" "from the sphere of
protected legislative activity" 2 6 was not simply an abstract theoretical one.
Brennan was working with a much more sophisticated understanding of
the actual workings of American politics than were his colleagues in the
majority in the Gravel case. Brennan understood, as they did not, that the
allocation of constitutional power as between institutions is fundamentally
inseparable from the interactions that those institutions have with their
broader publics. He understood, as they did not, that structuring its
interactions with the public is an essential function of each of those
institutions, and therefore that interference by one with the manner in
which another interacts with the public is every bit as detrimental to the
American system of separated powers as interference in the so-called
"internal" workings of that other institution. And in looking closely at the
ways in which members of Congress have revealed the executive branch's
secrets to the public, or the ways in which they have structured their
investigations and hearings so as to win over the public (or many other
125. See id.
126. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 649 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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public-facing mechanisms that time constraints prevent me from
discussing herel 2 7), we can see that Brennan was right.
127. I have discussed a number of them in some detail in CHAFETZ, supra note 25, at
45-301.
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